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CIVIC AND MORAL EDUCATION.¹

J. S. MACKENZIE.

ALMOST my only qualification to address an educational society is to be found in my connection with the Civic and Moral Educational League; and it is chiefly as a representative of that League that I now venture to speak. At the same time, I should wish it to be clearly understood that I express only my own individual view of the aims and work of the League; and that it is not to be held responsible for anything that I may say.

The general aim of the League is very simple and obvious. It is to emphasize the importance of good citizenship as the fundamental object that education should seek to promote; and to try to secure that this object is pursued in a systematic and efficient way. That it must be pursued in some way, would, I suppose, be admitted by every one. The question can only be with regard to the degree of importance that is to be given to it, the exact way in which it is to be interpreted, and the best methods by which it can be attained. At the present moment, its importance is probably less likely to be questioned in this country than it might have been some years ago. The great war has brought home to most of us the supreme need of the spirit of civic devotion; and it can hardly be supposed that that spirit can be fully developed without some form of education, direct or indirect, systematic or casual, formal or incidental.

It may be well, at the outset, to remove a serious misconception that is sometimes formed on this subject. It is apt to be thought that the concentration of attention on the development of individual character and the cultivation of the civic spirit is somewhat opposed to the more purely intellectual aims of education. I believe there is extremely

¹A Lecture delivered at the University of Sheffield.

little foundation for such a view. There are few things that are more calculated to stimulate reflection than the study of moral and social problems. Most other subjects are more or less external to us. They have to be accepted, to some extent, on trust. We have to rely upon the authority of those who have made a personal investigation of them; and they offer comparatively little scope for independent thought. Indeed I am afraid that some of the recent efforts to make things easy for the young, have tended to reduce thought to a minimum—*e.g.* in the study of geometry. It is found to be difficult to think accurately about things that are rather remote from our more immediate interests; and, in trying to simplify them, we are liable to make our thought inexact or superficial. With moral and civic questions, however, we are very immediately at home. They appeal directly to our hearts and consciences, and we can form our own judgments upon them. Hence, as Kant remarked, even unreflective people often become surprisingly acute in their moral judgments. The history of intellectual development bears out this contention. The most remarkable period of intellectual progress in ancient Greece, perhaps the most remarkable in the history of the world—that which is chiefly represented by the names of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—owed its inspiration very largely to the effort to cultivate the spirit of good citizenship, and to study its conditions. What moral education is opposed to, is not the development of intellectual interests, but rather the treatment of education as merely an instrument for getting on in the world, of developing a sense of class superiority, or of amassing a body of undigested knowledge.

In connection with what I have just been saying, however, it may be of some interest to notice some recent changes in the work of the League which seem to me to have a good deal of significance. They are shown, to some extent, in the alterations that have been made in its title. It began as the Moral Instruction League; then it became the Moral Education League; and now it is the Civic and Moral Education League. I do not wish to exaggerate the

importance of these transformations. Its general objects remain substantially what they were from the outset. But I think the changes in the title do imply some difference of outlook—a difference which corresponds, to some extent, to that which was brought about in the course of the development of early Greek thought on the subject. Moral instruction suggests an attitude somewhat like that which was adopted by the body of teachers who were known in Greece as the Sophists. Protagoras, their leader, professed to give instruction to young men in the art of citizenship. Plato, in the dialogue called by his name, represents a young man as going to Protagoras to find out what he might hope to learn from his instructions; and Protagoras is represented as answering: "Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were the day before." Socrates is then represented as asking Protagoras whether he means to say that he instructs young men in the art of good citizenship; and Protagoras answers that this is indeed what he professes. Socrates then expresses some doubts as to whether the art of citizenship can be taught, in the same sense in which the art of ship-building or shoe-making may. Socrates himself did not, it would seem, profess to teach men or to instruct them in anything, but only to lead them to reflect and find out what is right for themselves. In so doing, he appealed to the individual mind and conscience; and I believe that, in changing its title from Moral Instruction to Moral Education, the League meant to indicate that it agreed rather with Socrates than with Protagoras in this respect. The chief objection to mere instruction is that it may, so to speak, only touch the surface of the mind. In all education, and most of all in moral education, it is essential that what is learned should sink into the depths of our being, and become a living and active part of ourselves. If it does not spring from our own immediate consciousness, it must at least get in, so as to become a second nature—almost like an instinct. It seems

to have been largely on this account that the sophistical conception of instruction was unsatisfactory. Indeed, one does not become even a good artist by instruction, but largely by acquiring insight through practice. But now when we pass from Socrates to Plato and Aristotle, we seem to find a further change in the conception of education that is set before us—a change which, to some extent, brings us back to Protagoras, and reintroduces the element of instruction, though in a different form. In Plato's *Republic*, in particular, which has probably done more than any other writing to stimulate reflection on the fundamental aims of education, we find the emphasis laid, not on the individual consciousness, but rather on the study of the civic unity within which the life of the individual has to be carried on; and this aspect of education was even more definitely emphasized by Aristotle. The transition from Moral Education to Civic and Moral Education may be taken to imply a somewhat similar advance. At the present time, the activities of the League are largely directed to the work of bringing out the importance of cultivating a right appreciation of the claims that are made upon us by the society in which we live.

Now, it may be thought by some that, if the League has thus been passing through phases that correspond, more or less, to those that are represented in ancient Greek speculations, it cannot be dealing very directly with the problems that are at present most urgent. But this would be a great mistake. Every generation that tries to deal seriously with the problems of life—whether with reference to education, to the structure and activities of the state, to religion, or to any other of our deepest concerns—finds itself faced with the same difficulties as those with which other generations had to deal. We have the same human nature as those who lived before us, though we have new faces and new clothes. But, in order to indicate more definitely how the work of the League bears upon the most pressing problems of the present, it may be well at this point to notice another objection that might be made to its ac-

tivities. It might be said that, in urging the importance of the development of character and of the civic spirit, it is, so far as our own country is concerned, preaching to those who are already converted. For it is sometimes stated, and not without some show of reason, that the characteristic feature of British education, as distinguished especially from that given in Germany, is its emphasis on the formation of character, rather than on the acquisition of knowledge. We have often taken credit to ourselves for this; and, to a considerable extent, the credit has been allowed by observers in other countries, and notably in Germany itself. Even General von Bernhardi, who is at present regarded as very specially the enemy of our country, has contrasted German education unfavourably with our own in this particular respect. Is it really necessary then, it may be asked, to press this aspect of education at the present time? Should we not rather devote our energies to the promotion of technical instruction, in which we are confessedly deficient? To this I might answer, in old words that have not altogether lost their force, let us "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," and other things will be added. If we have neglected technical instruction, it is probably due, to a considerable extent, to an inadequate sense of our civic obligations. In order to bring this out, it may be well to inquire in what sense it is true, and in what sense it is not true, that education in this country has been aiming at the cultivation of the civic spirit.

When it is said that education in this country has tended to lay emphasis on the development of character and the cultivation of the civic spirit, it would seem that the kind of education that is specially in view is that which is given in the great public schools and in the older universities, especially Oxford. It is at least true that that education has been predominantly humanistic, rather than scientific—if such an antithesis may be allowed; and, under the influence of such teachers as Arnold of Rugby or Jowett and Green at Oxford, it is certainly the case that a good deal of emphasis has been laid on character and the civic spirit; and it is no

doubt true also that these influences have penetrated, to a certain extent, into some other modes of education in this country. Much of what has been done in this way has no doubt been quite admirable; but representatives of the Civic and Moral Education League would urge that it has been too limited in its scope and not sufficiently systematic. Its defect, in general, would seem to lie in the fact that it has set out with a particular class of the community in mind, and that it has hardly been able to free itself from the limitations that have been thus introduced. Broadly speaking, its aim has been the development of a cultivated "gentleman." Now, the qualities that are suggested by this term, fine though they are, are not all those that are of high importance in human life. Among the qualities, for instance, that it does not suggest are clearness of thought, breadth of interest, definiteness of aim, strenuousness of purpose, thoroughness in work. It might be profitable to contrast, in this respect, the British conception of Culture with what the Germans call Kultur—a term that has perhaps been somewhat too much ridiculed.

The difference between the connotations of the two terms may be compared with the difference between Horticulture and Agriculture. We tend to speak of a "fine flower of culture." We think of it as what distinguishes the select man from the ordinary man. Kultur, on the other hand, means rather a standard of life that belongs to a whole people. Culture was explained by Matthew Arnold (adopting a phrase of Swift's) as meaning essentially "sweetness and light." It may be doubted whether the qualities that are thus expressed have been conspicuously cultivated in this country. I should think that what have chiefly been cultivated are self-reliance, the sense of honour, loyalty to one's class or party or set, and a certain light-hearted fortitude. These qualities give to the English gentleman, as Goethe noted, a kind of completeness. Often, Goethe said, he is only a "complete fool"; but even that is something. The German, on the other hand, learns chiefly industry, thoroughness, devotion to his special work—qualities that do

not specially belong to any one class. His work may be pernicious; he may be thoroughly wrong, or thorough only in his frightfulness; but it is his characteristic that he is always striving and industrious—"immer strebend sich bemüht." It must be confessed that the qualities he tends to develop cannot very well be compared to those of a flower. It is said to have been recently remarked by a German, that "the English will always be fools, and the Germans will never be gentlemen." I should hope that there is no law of nature that makes either of these statements eternally true. But what is wanted, I think, is to try to combine the special characteristics of the Germans with those that are more peculiarly British, and perhaps to add to them both a little more of what Arnold meant by "sweetness and light."

One of the chief points of interest, for our present purpose, in noticing these different types of education, is that they represent different conceptions of what it is most important to aim at in the development of human life; and that, to a very considerable extent, they succeed in achieving what they aim at. We are thus led to recognize at least that the attempt to realize a moral ideal by means of education is not wholly futile; and we are thus encouraged to ask whether it would not be possible to achieve something better in this respect than has yet been accomplished. It might, no doubt, be rash to conclude that educational efforts in the school alone would suffice to bring about what is desired; for such national ideals as we have been noticing are supported, to a large extent, by home influences and social traditions. Until these are established, the efforts of the school to cultivate moral qualities are necessarily an uphill fight; and one can hardly expect that their results will be immediately apparent. But this only makes it the more important that the effort should be made as soon as possible; so that traditions may gradually become established for future generations. In the meantime, the differences of traditions and surroundings no doubt involve that different methods will have to be adopted in different types of

school; so that the laying down of any uniform and rigid programmes would be unwise. Still, the general aim at least ought to have a real unity.

It may be worth while to indicate at this point a little more definitely what appear to be some of the chief defects in the kind of moral cultivation with which we are more or less familiar as the fruit of our public school methods. My knowledge of them is not very great, and is in the main secondhand; but they have often been discussed, and perhaps we may assume that we understand them sufficiently well for our present purpose. Most of us would recognize, for instance, that a certain spirit of loyalty is cultivated in these schools; but it can hardly be maintained that it is, in general, the spirit of loyalty to everything that is true and beautiful and good. Too often it is rather the spirit of loyalty to class or party and to certain conventions or traditions that are associated with these. No doubt it may be necessary to begin with limited forms of loyalty; but at least they ought to open up readily into those that are more comprehensive. Again, I suppose it is on the whole the case that truthfulness is cultivated; but it seldom means the habit of speaking "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." To aim at this implies truth-seeking, as well as truth-speaking; and truth-seeking implies some cultivation of the spirit of scientific research. But it appears to be still, in general, true that science is despised in the schools to which I am referring, and philosophy ignored. Even in the older universities some traces of this neglect were at least apparent in quite recent times. It was the fashion to refer to science by the not very flattering name of "stinks"; and in Cambridge philosophy was sometimes described as "moral stinks." The epithets may have been partly jocular, and I do not deny that there is some point in the joke. A good deal of physical science, and even some moral science, is concerned with things that are pestilent and poisonous. I am not sure that I should like to see "Wissenschaft," even in the very wide sense in which that term is used in Germany, placed on quite as high a pedestal

as it occupies there. It was Mephistopheles who spoke of "Verstand und Wissenschaft" as the highest of human powers. I think the aesthetic and moral powers are of quite an equal rank. Yet the pursuit of truth is an element in goodness; and this has been too much neglected. Probably English people are not altogether wrong in being somewhat sceptical about formulas, and in valuing the kind of insight that can be got by intuition, common sense, and practical experience, as well as that which is gained by scientific analysis; but I am pretty sure that we tend to under-rate the importance of the latter; and this is, to some extent, a moral defect—it makes us careless and amateurish, where we ought to be exact. Again, I suppose every one would allow that certain ideals of honour and justice are cultivated in the schools to which I am referring—especially the kind of fairness that is expressed by the phrase "playing the game." Such a phrase may no doubt be used to express the finest conceptions of fairness and chivalry; but it betrays its origin in a comparatively idle class, and it is to be feared that it is apt to retain some of the limitations of its origin. There may sometimes be a need for Browning's reminder that the work of life is not "mere fool's play, make-believe and mumming." A similar limitation may perhaps be observed in the emphasis that is laid on cleanliness, which is apt to refer too exclusively—though not, I think, entirely—to the outside of the cup and platter. Courage, again, is undoubtedly cultivated, but chiefly in the form of physical fortitude. The kind of courage that enables a man to stand singly "uttering odious truth" is probably not very highly developed. I note these limitations with some diffidence;² but I doubt at least whether we can altogether afford to ignore the fact that, with all our emphasis on moral qualities, our country has been commonly known on the Continent as "perfidious Albion," and that we are generally believed to be characterized by hypocrisy and pharisaical conventions. Such accusations

²Mr. Chesterton's Essay on "The Case for the Public Schools" in *What's Wrong with the World?* is worth referring to in this connection.

may be based—I think they are—to a very large extent on misunderstanding; our reserve and lack of foresight³ are apt to be interpreted as malicious concealment; but it is to be feared that there is some degree of truth in them. A good deal of our talk about character and moral principle is apt to be little better than cant. We are perhaps more liable than most people to say things that we only half mean. We have, in general, neither the logical clearness of the French nor the downright and somewhat brutal thoroughness of the Germans. It is at least important to urge that, whatever moral qualities are cultivated, we should see to it that they are cultivated in reality, and not merely in appearance; that they affect the heart and conscience, and not only the more superficial forms of behaviour.

So far I have been referring to the kind of moral cultivation that is specially characteristic of our public schools, and of other institutions that are concerned with those who have leisure for somewhat prolonged methods of cultivation. But it is pretty obvious that it is even more important that the cultivation of those who have comparatively little leisure should be adequately attended to. No doubt the qualities that are acquired by those in higher station have some tendency to penetrate into other classes as well; but what is learned only by imitation is apt to be somewhat superficial. Recently some notable attempts have been made to develop character and the civic spirit in classes widely removed from those that attend the public schools. It is enough to refer to the most admirable work that has been done by General Baden Powell and to such experimental schools as the Little Commonwealth, in which truly astonishing results have been achieved. Our League regards all such efforts with the utmost sympathy, and has done its best to make them widely known and appreciated. It believes, however, that a great deal more is still called for, chiefly perhaps in the way of securing a more adequate

³Not *lack of imagination*, as commonly said. Our imaginative literature seems to refute that. But, as a whole, we appear to be a nation of adventurers, living from hand to mouth.

preparation of teachers for this kind of work; but also in enlisting the co-operation of parents, in extending the scope of this aspect of education, and in discovering fresh methods of carrying it on. To consider in detail what is wanted in any of these respects, would carry me beyond the limits of such a lecture as this, and would open up problems with which I am not specially qualified to deal. It will probably be best to content myself with a few general observations on what it is more particularly sought to cultivate.

It is pretty obvious that the fundamental aim of all education is essentially civic. Education might almost be defined as the process by which the individual is initiated into the life of his community. Most animals do not need any such initiation. Their instincts guide them sufficiently almost from the outset. But the human animal is not born a citizen. As it has been said, he has to be "*born again*"—and often, in Mrs. Poyser's phrase, "*born different*"—in order to become a member of his society. He has to learn its language, to become acquainted with some of its chief institutions, and to imbibe what he can of its general spirit. In order to do this effectively, he has even to study something of its history, and to appreciate its relations to older forms of civilization. It would be well perhaps if the significance of education, as such a process of initiation, were more clearly realised, and were more constantly present to the minds of those who are concerned with the education of the young. Such general initiation is evidently the necessary presupposition of all that follows; and it is supremely important that this foundation should be well and truly laid.

But an individual is not merely to be initiated into the general life of his community; he is also to be prepared for the performance of some specific work in it, by which he may contribute something to its continuance and advancement; and often this calls for a highly specialised training. This is one of the respects in which it is generally recognised that education in this country has been most markedly defective; and it can hardly be doubted that a greatly increased emphasis will be laid upon it in the future. The

work of the world has become too complex to be carried on successfully by amateurs. It needs a fully trained intelligence, now, to fit oneself for one's special work, for what has been described as "our Station and its Duties," may rightly be said to be an essential part of moral education, one might almost say even of religious education. Carlyle's favourite dictum, *Laborare est orare*, has at least an element of truth. It is true, however, only when the work is undertaken, as all work ought to be, in the spirit of social service; and there is always some danger that this may not be adequately recognised in the carrying out of technical instruction. In fitting ourselves for our special work, it is important that we should realize its place in the service of mankind. Unhappily, some kinds of work have but little value from this point of view; and one can only hope that they will sink as rapidly as possible into the background. When Falstaff says "It is no harm for a man to labour in his vocation," one is reminded that some vocations are little better than his—that of stealing. But most forms of work have some social value, and this should be kept prominently in view. It is unfortunate when any one has to regard the work in which he is engaged, not as a vocation, but only as an avocation, a parergon, to be taken up lightly and lightly dropped. Too many people in this country treat play as their serious vocation, and work as only an unfortunate interlude. If the social importance of the work on which we are engaged were adequately realised, this would not be the case. Hence I believe it is of considerable importance that instruction of a purely technical kind should not be begun too soon, and should, throughout its course, be combined with studies of a more humanistic kind; so that the place of any particular kind of work in the general life of the community may be duly realised.

And indeed, even at its best, the Gospel of Work has its limitations. Those who preach "the dignity of labour" are not always the most sincere friends of the man who labours. Life is not for the sake of work, but work for the sake of life. It is quite possible to be too much absorbed

in our work; though probably in this country there is less danger of that than in some others. We are all citizens of the universe, as well as of our particular states and districts. The interests of a human being cannot be confined to his own special task. He has his soul to cultivate and his friends to help; and, in spite of Carlyle and Nietzsche, it is not undesirable that he should be happy, so far as, in this somewhat chaotic world, he can be. He has to interest himself also in the maintenance and advancement of the general life of his community and even of the world. It is the chief business of all of us—and here at least we have Carlyle with us—to try to make our world, or some small spot in it, less chaotic and more human. The cultivation of these wider interests must no doubt be carried on, to a large extent, at a later stage than that of the school. I need hardly call attention to the important place that is filled by the Workers' Educational Association in the development of these wider interests. But the work of the school should be of such a kind as readily to awaken such interests, and prepare the way for their development. What our League seeks to emphasize is that all these forms of education should be regarded as being essentially modes in which the civic and moral spirit is undergoing cultivation.

It is of course not only in this country that the development of this conception of education is being furthered; though, in addressing an English audience, I have naturally referred chiefly to the conditions and the movements that are to be noted here. The impulse in this direction has come largely from America. I may refer, for instance, to the admirable work that has been done by Professor Dewey. The civic conception of education has also been much emphasized in France and in Japan; and it is making considerable headway in India and elsewhere; and movements that are at least somewhat akin to it have come from Italy. In Germany, I suppose most of us believe that the conception of state-obligation has been pressed in too narrow a spirit; but probably we have still something to learn even from that. It is of the very essence of this conception that it is

cosmopolitan in its character. It breaks through the barriers of race, language, nationality and creed; and helps to prepare the way for some genuine federation of the world. It is concerned with what is fundamentally human.

Indeed, even within the limits of our own island, there are many aspects of the subject, besides those to which I have alluded, that might be profitably considered. I might refer, for instance, to my own country. It has been the fashion of late to hold up Scotland as a model for the south in questions relating to education; and, in some respects, this is right enough. It is true, I think, that there has been a more widespread interest in education there than here. But the actual merits of the education that is given in Scotland are, I think, sometimes exaggerated. The interest in education in Scotland is largely traceable to the work and influence of John Knox; and, so far as I can judge, the most important element that he contributed to it was a deep sense of moral obligation. This was connected with a particular type of religious conviction, which has of course subsequently undergone great modifications; but it has left behind it a serious—though not always a very enlightened—view of the purposes of life, which has been of very great value. The Catechism, little as it may appeal to modern thought, did much to stimulate reflection on the deeper problems of life. Something similar, I think, and in some ways better, is to be found south of the border in the Society of Friends and, in some other countries, in the educational work of the Moravians. But there is apt to be some narrowness of outlook in all these cases, owing to the fact that the moral ideas are not brought sufficiently into relation with the larger problems of life. I am not now attempting to deal with the way in which civic and moral education is related to teaching of a definitely religious kind. In a wide sense of the word, it necessarily is religious in its character; but I think it is apparent, from the different types of it to which I have referred, that it need not be associated with any particular creeds. The greater part of our civic and moral obligations is clear enough, whatever view we may

take with regard to the very difficult problems about the structure of the universe and our place in it. Most people now recognise that these problems cannot be solved by any simple formulas. But what we mean by the ultimate value—Truth, Beauty and Goodness—is independent of creeds. This leads me, however, to notice a kind of objection that is sometimes raised to the attempt to give civic and moral education in schools.

It is sometimes asked, whether we are urging that sociology and ethics should be treated as school subjects. Such subjects, it is said, are found to present considerable difficulties even in the universities; and even the greatest experts are still perplexed by some of the difficulties that they involve. Such a criticism cannot, I think, be taken very seriously. The science of language is by no means an easy one; yet children can be taught to speak. They can also be taught some arithmetic and some of the elements of mathematics, and find these subjects of considerable value; though they could hardly venture upon the theory of numbers, the integral calculus, or the *Principia Mathematica* of Messrs. Russell and Whitehead. Even the science of mechanics is not altogether easy; yet a good many young people, often not otherwise of a very studious type, contrive to get some insight into the working of a motor bicycle, and sometimes have their intellectual interests considerably awakened in the process. Some knowledge about duty and about the aims of social life is not more difficult than these others to acquire, is not less interesting or intellectually stimulating, and can be as readily applied in practice. Indeed, the difficulty that is found in the study of sociology and ethics in later life is partly due to the fact that the simpler aspects of them have not been made familiar at an earlier stage. If people have grown up with the impression that their civic and moral obligations are mainly matters of convention and taboo, it is naturally difficult for them at a later stage to take up their study in a systematic and reflective way; just as the higher parts of mathematics are difficult for those who have acquired the elements by rote.

Even Plato, who seems to have thought that it was dangerous to introduce any scientific study of moral problems until people had reached the age of thirty, yet advocated a very thorough method of communicating moral ideas from an early age. I believe, however, that the distinction which he thus sought to make between a reflective and an unreflective morality is one that cannot be sharply drawn; especially in times like ours, in which social and moral problems are freely discussed in books that are readily accessible to every one. And the dangers that he apprehended, especially the weakening of moral ideas by reflective criticism, are chiefly to be feared only when the earlier conceptions of social and moral obligation have been of a thoroughly conventional and unreflective type. Hence I think it is important that even the earliest treatment of such subjects should contain some appeal to the intelligence; and that there should be no real break between the formation of habits and the growth of reflection. Even young children are, in general, anxious to know the *why* of any action that is adopted and this wish should, as far as possible, be gratified. "Let youth but know," as Mr. Archer has so well insisted. Most people of my generation were kept a good deal in the dark, or fed on creeds outworn; and we naturally feel anxious that those of the generation that is now rising should be freed from such repressive influences, and enabled to see and think for themselves. They will thus be saved from much waste of effort and from much misery and much danger in their later life. There should be no "supposititious parents," as Plato called the well-meant fictions by which the young are so often deceived. It is largely such fictions that make subsequent reflection difficult, and sometimes pernicious. I cannot for a moment believe that young people will be made less patriotic by being told, quite truthfully, how their country has helped them in the past, and does still help them; that they will become less respectful to their parents by learning, quite accurately, what they owe to them; that boys and girls will become less careful in their relations to one another by hav-

ing explained to them the quite real dangers into which they are liable to fall; that they will have less admiration for heroism when they know exactly what some heroes have done and suffered; that they will be less sincere lovers of peace by realizing the actual miseries that are brought about by war; or that they will be less temperate when they see clearly the degradations of intemperance. And similar remarks might be made about all the virtues. It is not the truth that we have to fear, but rather the false glamour of romance, and the thoughtless following of foolish customs.

All depends, of course, on the adaptation of the teaching to the age and capacity of the learner. Hence I believe that the most important thing to aim at, in the first instance, is the training of teachers for the proper treatment of such subjects. It is very necessary that some teachers at least should specially qualify themselves for this particular kind of work. It is gratifying to notice that a good many institutions are beginning to move in the direction of providing courses of training for those who seek to fit themselves for various forms of what is called "social work." It can hardly be doubted that there will be an increasing demand for such training, and that it will lead to a greater degree of attention being given to ethical and social problems. Much of the work that has so far been undertaken in the way of cultivating the moral consciousness in a more intelligent fashion has been undertaken with special reference to the treatment of young people who are in some respects defective or undeveloped, or who have suffered from inauspicious social surroundings; but what is learned in dealing with these can often be advantageously applied, with some modifications, to those who are more happily circumstanced.

At any rate, I am convinced that those who are at present struggling for a more adequate recognition of the civic and moral aspects of education are not entering upon a forlorn hope. There probably never was a time that was more ripe than the present for a great advance in all forms of educational work, and especially in those that are directed to an

increase in the general efficiency of the citizen. It seems to be true that a period of comparative peace and prosperity has produced a considerable degree of torpor in our general life; and it is certainly discouraging to find, even in this time of national stress, that educational activities are, in many directions, checked and weakened in a very light-hearted fashion. But there are good grounds for believing that the process of awakening has begun; though perhaps it has shown itself so far more conspicuously with reference to problems that are industrial, technical and material than to those that are more ethical and spiritual; and though, like some other awakenings, it seems sometimes to be characterised rather by yawning and rubbing the eyes than by vigorous action. I certainly do not believe—I suppose none of us believes—that the revival of the best features of our national life, and the raising of them to a higher power, is hopeless. “Still in our ashes live their wonted fires.” We may remind ourselves of the words of Milton, at a somewhat similar crisis in our national life, when he had a vision of his country as an eagle “mewing its mighty youth,” or when he spoke of it as “a noble and puissant nation, rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks.” One can but trust that, when she wakes, she will not be in the humour to be put off with any feeble tinkering of the educational system, but will insist on reforms of a thorough and complete character. If so, it can surely not be doubted that one of the reforms will consist in the adoption of more strenuous methods for the cultivation of the civic and moral spirit—a spirit which should neither be that of what Nietzsche called “slave-morality,” nor yet that of what he called “master-morality,” but rather that of the morality of free citizens, who realise that they are co-operating with their brothers and sisters all over the world for the promotion and maintenance of all things that are true and beautiful; not the spirit of the “Will to Power,” but that of the Will to Good. It is for us, at any rate, to do what we can to insure that it is this spirit that is cultivated.

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